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White-Collar Crime and the Recession:
Was the Chicken or Egg First?
Ellen S. Podgort

INTRODUCTION

The recent news media is filled with continual stories of
2
white-collar crimes. 1 One finds a growing list of Ponzi schemes,
mortgage frauds, 3 and financial-institution crimes. 4 It cannot go
unnoticed that Bernard Madoff defrauded thousands of investors
f Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. Thanks go to research assistant Christina L. Kimball.
1 See, for example, Associated Press, 26 Arrested in Three States in Medicare Fraud
Schemes, NY Times A33 (Dec 15, 2009) (discussing arrest of twenty-six in a $61 million
Medicare fraud crackdown); Zachary Kouwe, Lawyer Pleads Guilty to Selling Insider
Tips, NY Times B3 (Dec 11, 2009) (discussing an insider-trading ring that has implicated
thirty people thus far). See also Ellen S. Podgor, In the News and Around the Blogosphere
online
at
Prof
Blog
2010),
(White
Collar
Crime
httpV lawprofessors.typepad.con/whitecollarcrimeblog/news (visited Sept 9, 2010) (compiling links to news stories in newspapers and on blogs that are related to white-collar
crime).
2 See, for example, Michael Pollick, Ponzi Convictions Are Weightier Now, Sarasota
Herald-Trib Al (Dec 20, 2009) (discussing the increased sentences for Ponzi schemes
because of the increased number being noticed); Michael Pollick, Has the Gulf Coast Become a Ponzi Haven?, Sarasota Herald-Trib Al (Sept 21, 2009) (discussing different Ponzi
schemes that have occurred in Florida); Leslie Wayne, The Mini-Madoffs, NY Times B1
(Jan 28, 2009) (discussing different Ponzi schemes that have been discovered in the aftermath of the Madoff scheme).
3 See Testimony of Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer, Hearingson Mortgage
Fraud, Securities Fraud, and the Financial Meltdown: Prosecuting Those Responsible
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 111th Cong, 2d Sess (Dec 9, 2009), online at
http //udiciary.senate.gov/pdf/09-12-09BreuerTestimony.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2010) ("Testimony of Assistant General Lanny Breuer"). Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer
cited examples of the coordinated efforts of mortgage fraud prosecutions, including Operation "Malicious Mortgage," which included charges against more than 400 defendants,
Operation "Quick Flip," which resulted in charges against approximately 155 defendants,
and Operation "Continued Action," which targeted 150 cases of mortgage frauds and
other schemes in over 150 cases. See id at 10-11. See also FBI, 2008 Mortgage Fraud
Report "Year in Review", online at http//www.fbi.gov/publicationWfraud/mortgagefraud08.htm (visited Sept 9, 2010) (providing a compilation of key mortgage fraud cases
for the 2008 year).
4 See FBI, Financial Crimes Report to the Public Fiscal Year 2007, online at
http/www.fbi.gov/publications/financiaVfcs-report2007/financial-crime_2007.htm (visited Sept 9, 2010) (providing data on financial frauds, including a compilation of major
investigations and prosecutions).
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in what is considered one of the largest personal frauds in United
States history.5 The public, outraged by white-collar crime, has
applauded sentences that far exceed typical sentences issued in
the past,6 with many first-time offenders receiving double-digit
sentences.7 Equally persuasive evidence that white-collar crime
is a significant issue is the growing list of corporate crimes. 8 An
expanding list of companies have entered into deferred and nonprosecution agreements with the government 9 to minimize their
exposure in a post-ArthurAndersen world.1 0
5 See Madoff's Victims (Wall St J Mar 6, 2009), online at httpV/s.wsj.net/public/
resources/documents/stmadoffvictims_20081215.html (visited Sept 9, 2010) (providing a
list of Madoff's investors).
6 See, for example, Robert Frank and Amir Efrati, "Evil"Madoff Gets 150 Years in
Epic Fraud-Victims Cheer Tough Sentence; Judge Slams Financier for Stonewalling
Investigators;True Size of Losses Still a Mystery, Wall St J Al (June 30, 2009) (discussing
the 150 year sentence given to Bernard Madoff). Consider also Thorn Mrozek, PressRelease: Operatorof MX Factors Sentenced to 100 Years in Prison for Ponzi Scheme that
Cost Victims $39 Million (United States Attorney's Office, Central District of California
http;//www.justice.gov/usao/cac/pressroonV
at
online
2009),
28,
Sept
pr2009/116.html (visited Sept 9, 2010) (reporting on the 100-year sentence given to Richard Monroe Harkless, who ran a Ponzi Scheme).
7 See, for example, Abha Bhattarai, Sentences Reduced for Adelphia Founder and
Son (NY Times June 26, 2008), online at http;//www.nytimes.conV200/06/26/business/
media/26cable.html (visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing the reduction of Timothy Rigas's
sentence from twenty years to seventeen years); Associated Press, Ebbers Sentenced to 25
Years in Prison (MSNBC.com July 13, 2005), online at http/www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/8474930 (visited Sept 9, 2010) (reporting on Bernard Ebbers' twenty-five year prison
sentence); John R. Emshwiller, Supreme Court to Hear Appeal of Enron's Skilling, Wall
St J A6 (Oct 14, 2009) (discussing Jeffrey Skilling's initial sentence of twenty-four years);
Ellen S. Podgor, McFarlandSentence Affirmed with Unpublished Opinion (White Collar
Crime Prof Blog Nov 27, 2007), online at http;//lawprofessors.typepad.com/ whitecollarcrime-blog/2007/ll/mcfarland-sente.html (visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing the affirmance of Chlanda McFarland's thirty-year sentence for a first time white-collar offense).
8 See Testimony of Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer at 7 (cited in note 3).
Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer, in a recent report to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, noted that the Department of Justice had "obtained approximately 1,300
corporate fraud convictions, including convictions of more than 200 corporate chief executives or presidents, more than 120 vice presidents, and more than fifty chief financial
officers" since 2002. See also Mark Filip et al, Report to the President-CorporateFraud
Task Force (DOJ 2008), online at http;//www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftfVcorporatefraud2008.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2010) (providing descriptions of various corporate crimes
prosecuted by the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of
Labor, and other agencies). But see Matt Ackermann, SEC Settlements Fall for Second
Year (OnWallStreet Dec 7, 2009), online at http//www.onwallstreet.conVnews/SECsettlements-survey-2664906-1.html (visited Sept 9, 2010) (noting that SEC settlements
declined by 6.98 percent in 2009 to 626, the lowest annual number of settlements since
2002, when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was implemented).
9 See, for example, Wallace Witkowski, Beazer Settles with North Carolina, Feds
(Wall St J Marketwatch July 1, 2009), online at http;/www.marketwatch.com/story/
beazer-settles-with-north-carolina-feds (visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing the $7.5 million
contribution that Beazer will make as part of a deferred prosecution agreement with the
government); US Department of Justice Press Release, Novo Nordisk Agrees to Pay $9
Million Fine in Connection with Payment of $1.4 Million in Kickbacks Through the United
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In addition to white-collar crime being at the forefront of the
daily press, the media is filled with stories about our troubled
economy.11 One finds unemployment figures that far surpass figures of five or ten years ago 12 and economists are united in des13
ignating the recent past as a period of recession.
Although the existence of high-profile white-collar crime and
the economic recession are areas of recent concern, the correlaNations Oil-for-food Program (DOJ May 11, 2009), online at httpV//www.justice.
gov/opa/pri2009/May/09-crm-461.html (visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing the $9 million
fine Novo Nordisk agreed to pay as part of a deferred prosecution deal with the Department of Justice). See generally Candice Zierdt and Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred
Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 Ky L J 1, 1-2 (2007)
(discussing different deferred and non-prosecution agreements and how corporations are
willing to accept these agreements no matter the terms as an alternative to a "corporate
death sentence" in a post-Arthur Anderson world).
10 Companies are amenable to paying large sums of money as fines to avoid the possibility of an indictment that can have huge collateral consequences, such as the demise
of the company, as was seen following the Arthur Andersen LLP prosecution. See Arthur
Andersen LLP v United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). See also Ellen S. Podgor, Educating
Compliance, 46 Am Crim L Rev 1523, 1524 n 9 (2009) (discussing the example of Arthur
Anderson, which risked going to trial and did not survive, despite a later decision in favor
of the company by the Supreme Court).
11 See, for example, Hope Yen, Recession Pushes Income Gap Between Rich and Poor
(USA Today Online Sept 29, 2009), online at httpV/www.usatoday.con/money/economy/
2009-09-29-income-gap-census N.htm (visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing who has been hit
the hardest by the recession); Justin Lahart, The Great Recession: A Downturn Sized Up,
Wall St J A12 (July 28, 2009).
12 See, for example, Jeannine Aversa and Christopher S. Rugaber, What Recovery?
Unemployment Shoots Past 10 Percent, Associated Press (Nov 6, 2009) (noting that unemployment has shot past 10 percent for the second time since World War 11, and that
unemployment is the highest it has been since 1983); Labor Force Statistics from the
Current Population Survey (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010), online
at
http/data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?seriesid=LNS 14000000
(visited
Sept 9, 2010) (setting forth monthly unemployment statistics from January 2000-August
2010 that show the recession has made unemployment figures much higher than at any
time in the past decade).
13 See, for example, Kimberly Palmer, James Pethokoukis, and Luke Mullins, Your
2009 Recession Survival Guide (US News & World Report Dec 2, 2008), online at
http//www.usnews.conVmoney/personal-finance/articles/2008/1202/your-2009-recessionsurvival-guide.html (visited Sept 9, 2010) (noting that a recession has been "officially
declared" and discussing how to get through it); Nouriel Roubini, Op-Ed: A Global Breakdown of the Recession in 2009 (Forbes Jan 15, 2009), online at http/www.forbes.con/
2009/01/14/global-recession-2009-oped-cx nr 0115roubini.html (visited Sept 9, 2010)
(noting that "the industrial world is in outright recession" and breaking down the effect
the recession will have in different parts of the world); John Waggoner and Barbara Hansen, USA Today Survey: We're in Recession, Economists Say (USA Today Online Apr 29,
2008), online at httpV/www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-04-28-economy-surveyrecessionN.htm (visited Sept 9, 2010) (showing two-thirds of economists polled agreed
that the United States was in a recession). Many economists, however, are now stating
that the recession is over. See, for example, Associated Press, Most Economist Think
Recession Is Over (CBS Oct 12, 2009), online at http/cbs2chicago.con/nationa/ economists.recession.survey.2.1242593.html (visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing how 80 percent
of economists think the recession has ended, according to a survey by the National Association for Business Economics).
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tion between these two phenomena is less clear. 14 As targets for
causes of the economic downtown, darts are being thrown at the
subprime market 15 and the non-prosecution of white-collar criminality due to the increased Department of Justice (DOJ) focus
on terrorism. 16 A blame-game mentality can perhaps be seen,
and in some cases there is merit to these allegations. After all,
recent Ponzi schemes failed to be noticed until significant harm
had occurred to victims. 17 Additionally, corporate criminality that
negatively influenced the financial market often remained undetected with no prosecution.1 8
But the question remains as to whether white-collar criminality is an effect of the recession or in fact a cause of the recession. Is it that white-collar crime only becomes apparent because
of the downturn in the economy, or has this criminal conduct influenced the economic realities presently being experienced?
This Article looks at the causal connection between whitecollar crime and the recession, with an emphasis on the ramifications to white-collar crime detection and prosecution as a result
of the economic downturn. The Article considers accountability,
and how the lack of accountability factors into the recession. 19
Also considered is blame, and whether the blame directed at individuals or circumstances related to white-collar crime is warranted or merely a reaction to the negative downturn in the
20
economy.
14 See Andy Giegerich, White-Collar Crime Strikes Often in Times of Recession (Portland Bus J May 25, 2009), online at http/portland.bizjournals.com/portland/ stories/2009/05/25/focus4.html (visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing how certain white-collar
crimes increase during a recession); Sean P. Murphy, As Economy Falls, FraudReports
Rise, Boston Globe 29 (Feb 16, 1991) (noting how the recession is exposing frauds that
were previously undetected and causing more fraud to occur).
15 See, for example, Katalina M. Bianco, The Subprime Lending Crisis: Causes and
Effects of the Mortgage Meltdown 3 (CCH 2008), online at http/business.cch.com/ bankingfinance/focus/new /SubprimeWP_rev.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2010) ("Many experts and
economists believe [the financial crisis] came about through the combination of a number
of factors in which subprime lending played a major part."); Chris Isidore, Subprime
Woes: How Far, How Wide (CNN May 5, 2007), online at http/money.cnn.com/
2007/03/05/newsIeconomy/subprimeindex.htm (visited Sept 9, 2010) (explaining that the
subprime mortgage sector, "has suddenly become a very bad business-and possibly a
very big problem for the U.S. economy as a whole"); David J. Reiss, Ratings Failure: The
Need for a Consumer Protection Agenda in Rating Agency Regulation, 28 Banking & Financial Services Policy Report 12, 17 (Nov 2009) (stating that "the bust of the subprime
market in the mid-2000s led to the global financial crisis of the late 2000s.").
16 See notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
17 See notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
18 See note 4 and accompanying text.
19 See Part I and accompanying text.
20 See Part II and accompanying text. It is important to note that assessing the effect
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Finally, even though transparencynow allows us to reevaluate the financial downturn, it is important to recognize that
there are collateral consequences of financial crises that may affect the prosecution of white-collar crime. This Article looks at
one possible factor that might decrease white-collar prosecutions-the decline of print media, 21 and a second factor that
might increase white-collar prosecutions-new legislation and
funding to monitor government stimulus money. 22 This Article
concludes by noting that continued transparency is imperative to
23
decreasing white-collar criminality.
I. ACCOUNTABILITY

It is unclear whether a lack of accountability caused the economic downturn, furthered its cause, or just increased the impact
24
on many in society. The subprime market was out of control
and because it was not sufficiently monitored there were repeated instances of fraud. 25 In some instances, the frauds that were
of the recession on white-collar criminality and its prosecution is hindered by the statistical reporting methods used in tracking white-collar crime, most notably by the fact that
there is no category called white-collar crime in the reporting of these crimes. See Ellen S.
Podgor, Is DOJ "Cookingthe Books" in Its Reporting of White Collar Crime? (White Collar
Crime Prof Blog Nov 14, 2005), online at http;//lawprofessors.typepad.conV whitecollarcrime -blog/2005/11iisdoj_cooking_ .html (visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing the problems that arise because white-collar crime is not tracked as a separate category). See also
Ellen S. Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J Crim L & Criminol 731,
736-37 (2007) (noting that there is "a noticeable discrepancy in the way the Department
of Justice (DOJ) recognizes white collar crime").
21 See notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
22 See notes 103-112 and accompanying text.
23 See Conclusion.
24 See Charles Hopkins, Subprime Mortgage Market Crunch (Ezilon.com Jan 2,
2008), online at http/www.ezilon.conVarticles/articles98480/1/-Subprime-mortgagemarket-crunch (visited Sept 9, 2010) (explaining the subprime lending that led to the
subprime market becoming out of control); see also Richard Stoyeck, Stock InvestingSubprime Lender "New Century"-Out of Control (StreetDirectory.com), online at
http;/www.streetdirectory.conVtravel-guide/152086/mvestment/stockjinvesting-subpri
melendernewcentury out of control.html (visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing the out of
control lending practices of subprime lenders and New Century's attempts to restore
financial stabilization by making additional subprime loans); Allen Ferrell, Jennifer E.
Bethel, and Gang Hu, Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising from the 20072008 Credit Crises (Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No 612, Nov 17, 2008),
online at http/papers.ssrn.con/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1096582 (visited Sept 9,
2010). One study did find that it is unlikely that the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)
can be substantially linked to the subprime crisis. See Matt Phillips, Did CRA Cause
Mortgage Market Crisis? Nope, Says Fed Report (Market Beat-Wall St J, May 29, 2009),
online at http//blogs.wsj.com/mnarketbeal/2009/05/29/did-the-cra-cause-mortgage-marketcrisis-nope-says-fed-repor/ (visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing arguments that the CRA,
which pushed lenders to lend to low-income households, caused the current crisis).
25 See Raymond H. Brescia, Trust in the Shadows: Law, Behavior,and FinancialReRegulation, 57 Buff L Rev 1361, 1363-64 (2009) (asserting that the trust placed by regu-

210

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2010:

eventually prosecuted had caused enormous losses. 26 The high
loss figure may have been due in part to the length of time that
27
these frauds had gone undetected.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was an office with lax regulation and enforcement, 28 and Ponzi schemers
were allowed to draw in numerous individuals without scrutiny. 29 This is apparent in examining what happened in the Madoff
matter. The Inspector General's Report titled, Investigation of
Failure of the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoff's Ponzi Scheme

(Madoff Report) stated that the failure to detect Madoff's fraud
30
was not a result of ethical improprieties or conflicts of interest.
The Madoff Report noted that there was no evidence to support
any finding that "any SEC personnel who worked on an SEC examination or investigation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC (BMIS) had any financial or other inappropriate
connection with Bernard Madoff or the Madoff family that influ3
enced the conduct of their examination or investigatory work." '
But while finding no deliberate unethical conduct, the level of
competence and oversight of this regulatory body was extremely
weak. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigation found
"that the SEC received more than ample information in the form
lators in the financial market itself "fostered predation, overconfidence and unregulated
risk; it brought about financial ruin for many and has caused incalculable hardship
across the globe"); see also Reiss, 28 Banking & Financial Services Policy Report at 13-15
(cited in note 15) (discussing the subprime market's lack of regulation and standardization, which invited predatory lending).
26 See Alex Berenson and Diana B. Henriques, Look Back at Wall St. Wizard Finds
Magic Had Skeptics, NY Times Al (Dec 13, 2008) (discussing the large losses suffered by
Madoff investors).
27 See, for example, Liz Moyer, Could SEC Have Stopped Madoff Scam In 1992?
(Forbes, Dec 23, 2008), online at http;//www.forbes.con/2008/1223/madoff-fraud-sec-bizwall-cx lIm 1223madoff.html (visited Jan 31, 2010). See also Clifford Krauss, Phillip L.
Zweig and Julie Creswell, FraudParade: $8 Billion Case Is Next in Line, NY Times Al
(Feb 18, 2009) (reporting that regulators had taken note of irregular activities that are
now believed to be part of a large-scale scam by Robert Stanford starting as far back as
1998).
28 See Securities & Exchange Commission, Office of Inspector General, Case No OIG509, Investigation of Failureof the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoff's Ponzi Scheme Executive Summary 1 (SEC 2009), online at http/www.sec.gov/spotlight/ secpostmadoffreforms/oig-509-exec-summary.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2010) ("Madoff Report") (finding
that despite a number of complaints "a thorough and competent investigation or examination was never performed").
29 See, for example, David Scheer and Jesse Westbrook, Madoff 'Tragedy' Said to
Have Escaped Scrutiny by SEC (Update 4) (Bloomberg.com Dec 15, 2008), online at
http,/www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=a3T.FJ8oI5hI&pid=20601087 (visited Sept 9,
2010) (discussing how the SEC failed to uncover the Madoff fraud).
30 See MadoffReport at 1 (cited in note 28).
31 Id.
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of detailed and substantive complaints over the years to warrant
a thorough and comprehensive examination and/or investigation
32
of Bernard Madoff and BMIS for operating a Ponzi scheme."
The Madoff Report further stated "that despite three examinations and two investigations being conducted, a thorough and
33
competent investigation or examination was never performed."
In addition to a subprime market and lax regulation, oversight was weakened as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
focused on terrorism. 34 Post-September 11th, there were agent
reductions on investigations related to white-collar crime and
other non-terrorism activities. The reduction in agents likely resulted in the reduced number of white-collar prosecutions. 35 A
2004 Inspector General Report noted how many FBI agents were
transferred from "drug, violent crime, and white-collar crime
matters to terrorism-related programs."36 Where white-collar
crime was a top priority of the Department of Justice in 1991, by
37
2003 the emphasis in the department had significantly shifted,
including a reallocation of non-supervisory field agents. For example, in FY 2000 there were 2,460 non-supervisory field agents,
and in 2003, that number had dropped to 2,303.38 It is, therefore,
Id.
33 Id.
34 See US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report 04-39,
The Internal Effects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Reprioritization(DOJ 2004),
online at http'/www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBl/a0439/final.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010) ("FBI
Reprioritization")("In direct response to the September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) initiated transformation that,
among other things, established a new ranking of priorities and formally shifted a significant number of agents from traditional criminal investigative work to counterterrorism
and counterintelligence matters."). See also Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Special ReportThe Terrorism Trade-Off (2007), online at: http//www.seattlepi.con/ specials/fbi/ (visited
Oct 3, 2010) (listing a series of articles on the restructuring of the FBI after September
11).
35 See Paul Shukovsky, Tracy Johnson and Daniel Lathrop, The FBI's Terrorism
Trade-Off (Seattle Post-Intelligencer Apr 11, 2007), online at http /www.seattlepi.conv
national 311046_fbiterrorll.html (visited Sept 9, 2010) ('Thousands of white-collar criminals across the country are no longer being prosecuted in federal court-and, in many
cases, not at all-leaving a trail of frustrated victims and potentially billions of dollars in
fraud and theft losses.").
36 FBI Reprioritizationat iii (cited in note 34).
37 See Charles Anzalone, White-Collar Crime Has Become Priority of Law Enforcement, Buffalo News 1 (Apr 28, 1991) (describing how local FBI agents view white-collar
crime at the biggest threat to the area); See also FBI Reprioritizationat 8 (cited in note
34) (describing the refocusing of the FBI's mission in 2002, which made terrorism the top
priority and white-collar crime the seventh priority); Joe Tone, Priority Shift Raises Concerns FBI's Terrorism Focus Could Hamper Local Cops, Sun Herald (Biloxi) 1 (June 17,
2002) (discussing how FBI agents are being shifted from white-collar cases to antiterrorism cases).
38 FBI Reprioritization at 17 (cited in note 34) (reporting the FBI's reallocation of
32
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no surprise that the decrease in personnel working on whitecollar cases would result in a decrease in white-collar prosecutions. As noted in the 2004 OIG's report titled The Internal Effects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Reprioritization,
"[t]he FBI opened over 50 percent more Domestic Terrorism cases in FY 2003 than in FY 2000."39 This is in contrast to the fact
that "the FBI opened over 50 percent fewer Organized
Crime/Drug cases, 40 percent fewer Violent Crime cases, and
more than 25 percent fewer White-Collar Crime cases in FY 2003
than in FY 2000."40 The personnel shift was felt not only with
federal-level decreases, but it also trickled down to parallel and
41
joint white-collar state investigations.
Only recently do we see legislation attempting to return accountability and oversight to post-September 11th levels. Most
recently, the proposed FBI Priorities Act of 2009 introduced in
the Senate provides for increased funding to hire new agents who
would focus on investigating white-collar crime. 42 The proposed
legislation acknowledges the redirection of funds to "counterterrorism and counterintelligence activities" post-September 11,
2001. 43 It also acknowledges that "[ciriminal activity, including
fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, and insider trading may
have played a role in the financial industry upheaval of 2008 and
2009."44 The proposed Act calls for an appropriation of
"$150,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014 to
fund 1,000 Federal Bureau of Investigation field agents to investigate financial crimes." 45 This is not the first time that an attempt has been made to restore law enforcement efforts beyond
46
terrorism activities.
field agents in exhibit 2-7).
39 Id at 61.
40 Id at 34.
41 Id at 113-25 (noting the reductions of agents in FBI field offices that were focused
on investigating white-collar crime).
42 S 481, 111th Cong, 1st Sess (introduced Feb 25, 2009), online at http;/frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-binVgetdoc.cgi?dbname=lll_congbills&docid=f:s48lis.txt.pdf
(visited
Sept 9, 2010) ("FBI Priorities Act 2009"). See also Olympia Snowe, Press Release: Snowe,
Whitehouse Introduce Bill to Strengthen FBI Investigations of White-Collar Crimes (Feb
26,
2009),
online
at http//www.snowe.senate.gov/publi/mdex.cfm?FuseAction=
PressRoom.PressReleases &ContentRecordid= b3587ccl-802a-23ad-426c-997f05169fe8&
Region id=&Issueid=d697147c-006f-ad29-bfB7-8535bcef7cd7 (visited Oct 3, 2010) (discussing the introduction of the FBI Priorities Act of 2009 by Sen. Snowe and Sen.
Whitehouse).
43 FBI Priorities Act 2009 at § 2(2) (cited in note 42).
44 Id at § 2(3).
45 Id at § 3.
46 Senator Biden Introduces Bill to Hire 1,000 More FBI Agents to Help Fight Crime,
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But even if there are successful attempts to restore funds for
white-collar crime investigations and prosecutions, the downturn
in the economy may prove to be an impediment to reducing
white-collar crime because of reduced private sector assistance.
The federal sentencing guidelines for organizations provide incentives to companies for effective programs that monitor
against criminal conduct. Companies that "exercise due diligence
to prevent and detect criminal conduct" 4 7 through "effective compliance and ethics programs," 48 and that self-report and cooperate with the government when criminality does occur, receive
benefits when computing the fine that will be imposed upon
them. In the economic downturn, however, companies seeking to
ensure corporate compliance may find themselves financially
constrained by a world that requires cost-cutting, layoffs, and
budget trimming. 49 Companies may not be able to invest the
funds necessary to provide the internal accountability required
50
to assure proper oversight that would detect fraud.
II. BLAME
Retribution is sought and blame is placed in the aftermath of
a financial crisis, and this one is no different.5 1 White-collar
Ponzi schemers, mortgage fraudsters, and financial thieves are
often targeted as the cause of the present financial downturn. 52
As with most financial upheavals, legislation is implemented in
hopes of preventing future problems or perhaps providing a political symbolism that avoids a reoccurrence. The reactive approach
US Federal News (Feb 8, 2007) (noting that the additional agents would focus exclusively
on traditional crimes, allowing the FBI to remain focused on counterterrorism efforts
without abandoning its commitment to its traditional functions).
" See USSG § 8B2.1 (2009).
48 Id at § 8C2.5(f).
49 See, for example, Shari A. Brown, Shortcuts on FCPA Due Diligence Today Will Be
Costly Tomorrow (White Collar Crime Prof Blog Mar 3, 2009), online at http/law
professors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrimeblog2009/03/shortcuts-on-fc.html (visited Sept
9, 2010) (discussing how companies who take shortcuts on diligence might find themselves under investigation in the next few years).
50 Id.

51 For example, issues of whom to blame were seen in discussions after the savings
and loan crisis. See David A. Rosenbaum, The Savings Debacle:A Special Report: A Financial Disaster With Many Culprits, NY Times Al (June 6, 1990) (discussing where to
place the blame for the 1980s savings and loan crisis).
52 See Dominick Salvatore, The Financial Crisis: Causes, Effects, Policies, Reforms,
and Investment Strategies 3 (GEAM Mar 2009), online at http/www.geam.conVcommonV
newsdocsWlhe FinancialCrisis-CEPRIS.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2010) (stating that a multitude of factors could have contributed to the financial crisis, including instances of fraud
like the Madoff Ponzi scheme, subprime lending, and deregulation).
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of passing criminal justice legislation to respond to white-collar
criminality is not new. In the aftermath of the savings and loan
crisis of the 1980s, Congress passed the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989. 53 Likewise, following the Enron debacle, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by
54
Congress.
But the speed of placing blame often ignores true factual information that comes from a thorough investigation of the crisis.
For example, many have been quick to criticize fair value or
"mark-to-market" accounting as causing or exacerbating the financial crisis. 55 Yet, as authors Christian Laux and Christian
56
Leuz note, empirical evidence proves otherwise.
Equally improper in placing blame is to stereotype conduct
into a category that may be overinclusive.57 This is the case when
white-collar crime is stated as the cause of the economic downturn, as there is no designated category called white-collar crime
in the statistical reporting process of the Department of Justice. 58 Although the Department of Justice tracks fraud, bribery,
and other offenses that might be considered forms of white-collar
crime, 59 there is no general category of white-collar crime for all
these offenses.60 Further, the breadth of the offenses covered by
53 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub L No
101-73, 103 Stat 183 (1989).
54 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L 107-204, 116 Stat 802 (2002).
55 See, for example, Newt Gingrich, Suspend Mark-To-Market Now! (Forbes Sept 29,
2008), online at httpV/www.forbes.conV2008/09/29/mark-to-market-oped-cx-ng_0929
gingrich.html (visited Sept 9, 2010) (contending that suspension of mark-to-market accounting will calm the troubled economy).
56 See Christian Laux & Christian Leuz, Did Fair-ValueAccounting Contribute to the
FinancialCrisis?,24 J Econ Persp 93, 95 (2010).
57 See FBI Financial Crimes Report to the Public Fiscal Year 2006, online at
httpV//www.fbi.gov/publications/fmancial/fcsreport2006/fmancial-crime_2006.htm
(visited Sept 9, 2010). See also note 20 and accompanying text.
58 White-collar crime was initially a sociological concept coined by Edwin Sutherland.
See Podgor, 97 J Crim L & Criminol at 734-36 (cited in note 20) (discussing the origin of
"white collar crime"). There are no set crimes as to what is included or not in the category
of white-collar crime. See Ellen S. Podgor, Corporateand White Collar Crime: Simplifying
the Ambiguous, 31 Am Crim L Rev 391-92 (1994) (discussing the fluctuating nature of
white-collar crime).
59 See US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 2004 31 (DOJ Dec 2006), online at http/bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ content/
pub/pdf/ccs04.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2010).
60 Interesting questions arise here, such as whether one should include agriculture,
antitrust, and food and drug crimes within the white-collar grouping. Additionally, crimes
such as mail fraud under 18 USC § 1341 or § 1346 might be considered white-collar
frauds, but when serving as predicate acts of RICO it might not be such an offense. See
generally Podgor, 97 J Crim L & Criminol at 731 (cited in note 20) (emphasizing the need
to include sociology as a factor in white-collar sentencing based on the nonviolent nature
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what might be considered white-collar crime is enormous. For
example, is a conspiracy offense a white-collar crime, or only
when the conspiracy involves a fraud? Likewise, Racketeered
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) 61 cases are not
classified to designate those with fraud predicates and those that
might be related to non-white-collar cases such as organized
62
crime activities.
Many argue that mortgage fraud or Ponzi schemes had a
negative impact on the economy. Less vocal are allegations that
bribery63 or Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 64 violations
were the impetus for the economic downturn. If placing blame, it
is important to recognize the breadth in white-collar crime and
the fact that this grouping does not deserve retributive justice
when it had little correlation to the sagging economy.
When blame is designated upon a constituency or body of
law, the legislative reaction can be very pronounced. 65 Penalties
can be increased, 66 new crimes 67 or regulations created, and legislative money poured into rectifying what is perceived to be the
problem. 68 It is no wonder that we face overcriminalization 69 as
each legislative reaction seems timely with the crisis du jour.

of the crimes and the severe sentencing measures currently in place).
61 18 USC § 1961 et seq.
62 See Jerold H. Israel, Ellen S. Podgor, Paul D. Borman, and Peter J. Henning,
White CollarCrime: Law and Practice9 (West 3d ed 2009) (discussing how specific crimes
can be both white-collar and non-white-collar offenses).
63 See 18 USC § 201 (2006).
64 21 USC § 301 et seq (2006).
65 Consider proposed congressional legislation that focuses on implementing "postMadoff Reforms." See, for example, Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2009, HR 4173, 11lth Cong, 2d Sess § 7306 (2009-2010), online at http/frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=lllcong.bills&docid=f:h4l73rfs.txt.pdf (visited Sept
9, 2010).
66 Mail fraud was once a crime that carried a maximum term of five years. It was
increased to twenty years in 1990 and now carries a penalty of up to thirty years when it
affects a financial institution. See 18 USC § 1341 (2009); Ellen S Podgor, Mail Fraud:
Opening Letters, 43 SC L Rev 223, 263-67 (1992) (describing the increase in sentences for
mail fraud by Congress in relation to RICO)
67 The increased scrutiny on health care fraud was crucial in the passage of a health
care fraud statute, 18 USC § 1347 (2006).
68 See Carl Hulse, House Approves Tougher Rules on Wall Street, NY Times Al (Dec
11, 2009). See also Ellen S. Podgor, 46 Am Crim L Rev at 1525-30 (cited in note 10) (discussing the reactive approach to punishing misconduct).
69 See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Foreword: Overcriminalization: The Politics of
Crime, 54 Am U L Rev 541 (2005) (providing an overview of issues related to overcriminalization). See also Overcriminalized.com, online at http;//www.overcriminalized.
con/ (visited Sept 9, 2010) (providing resources on the increased criminalization of
crimes).
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The downside of this approach is seen in the movement by
law enforcement away from areas related to white-collar crime
and into terrorism activities following September 11th. 70 As financial stability now looms at the top, there is less focus on corporate misconduct-a key focus in the wake of the Enron-related
problems.7 1 What was once designated as the corporate fraud
task force has now been incorporated into a financial fraud task
force. 72 The reactive model typically used after a crisis provides
immediacy to solving the problem, but it often does not educate
for comprehensively solving future legal issues.7 3 In the long run,
one has to wonder whether plugging the hole in the dike by solving what may seem as an immediate problem will in fact place
pressure in other places that may cause additional problems.
Prosecutors understandably feel the necessity to show the
public that there will be punishment for criminal conduct, and
the prominence of this criminal conduct may increase the public
pressure on prosecutors to proceed with investigations and indictments. Criminality that may not have been heavily prosecuted in the past may now be targeted, and statutes such as mail
fraud, 74 wire fraud, 75 or other generic statutes that allow a wide
breadth of conduct to be included as criminal, are likely to be
used. 76 Prosecutors may respond by using "stop-gap"77 types of
70 See notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
71 See notes 105-09 and accompanying text. See also Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate
Fraud Task Force Moves into the FinancialFraud Task Force (White Collar Crime Prof
Blog Dec 10, 2009), online at http//lawprofessors.typepad.conVwhitecollarcrime_
blog/2009/12/corporate-fraud-task-force-dead- fmancial-fraud-task-force-in.html
(visited
Sept 9, 2010) (discussing the establishment of a task force to coordinate financial fraud
prosecutions). See also Jan Dennis, Attack on CorporateCrime Has Thrown Justice Out of
Whack, Legal Expert Says (Univ of Illinois News Bureau June 16, 2008), online at
httpV/news.illinois.edu/news/08/0616corporate.html (visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing how
post-Enron the focus was on prosecuting executives rather than having shareholders
receive a remedy through civil suit).
72 See Associated Press, U.S. Forms FinancialFraud Task Force (CBS Nov 17, 2009),
online at httpV/www.cbsnews.conVstories/2009/11/17/politics/man5684383.shtml (visited
Sept 9, 2010) (discussing the establishment of the financial fraud task force).
73 See generally Podgor, 46 Am Crim L Rev at 1532 (cited in note 10) (discussing the
importance of a proactive model towards eradicating criminality).
74 18 USC § 1341 (2006).
75 18 USC § 1343 (2006).
76 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean 'Criminal"?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 BU L Rev 193, 201 (1991)
(discussing the breadth of some statutes that permit prosecutorial discretion on whether
to proceed criminally or civilly).
17 See United States v Maze, 414 US 395, 405-06 (1974) (Burger, dissenting) ("When
a 'new' fraud develops-as constantly happens-the mail fraud statute becomes a stopgap
device to deal on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon, until particularized legislation can be developed and passed to deal directly with the evil.").
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statutes and stretching these statutes to meet new forms of criminality. A consequence of this approach is that it can deprive individuals of due process rights of notice as to what will be considered criminal. Most importantly, it is easier and more constitutionally sound to eradicate criminal conduct when individuals
are aware of the crime and comply with the law because they
recognize that their conduct is criminal, as opposed to criminalizing activity after the fact that individuals may not have been
78
aware of as criminal.
Prosecutors may also resort to "shortcut" charges to demonstrate a quick response to the criminal conduct. 79 In this regard,
we see charges of obstruction of justice,8 0 false statements,8 1 and
perjury8 2 as opposed to in-depth investigation and prosecution of
the actual financial frauds. The simplicity of proceeding with
these "short-cut" offenses, as opposed to long grand jury investigations that review all the documents and proceed on the merits
of the case, permits prosecutors to easily obtain guilty pleas and
convictions.8 3 This process, however, can serve to diminish holding individuals accountable for the actual crimes that were the
basis of an investigation. One hardly achieves a desired deterrence when the prosecution is not premised on the conduct that
is sought to be eradicated.
III. TRANSPARENCY
The recession serves as the impetus to provide a transparency that brings to light Ponzi schemes and existing frauds,8 4 such
as mortgage frauds8 5 and financial frauds.8 6 As aptly noted by
78 Obviously, this does not apply to many of the Ponzi schemers who acted with intent and knowledge that is unquestioned.
79 See Ellen S. Podgor, Arthur Andersen, LLP and Martha Stewart: Should Materiality Be an Element of Obstructionof Justice?,44 Washburn L J 583, 584 (2005) (arguing for
closer scrutiny of prosecutorial choices that are made on expediency grounds or as a
"shortcut").
80 18 USC § 1503 (2006).
81 18 USC § 1001 (2006).
82 18 USC § 1621 (2006).
83 See generally Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High
Stakes Risk Game, 85 Chi Kent L Rev 77 (2010) (arguing that the risk of going to trial
results in many more plea bargains in the context of white-collar prosecutions, thereby
making the process less about innocence or guilt and more about risk aversion).
84 See Kevin McCoy, Economic troubles Reveal Ponzi Plague; Recession Forces Some
UnravelingPyramid Schemes out into the Open, USA Today B1 (Apr 17, 2009) (discussing
the fact that the recession has caused numerous Ponzi and other fraud schemes to collapse and expose themselves).
85 See generally FBI's 2008 Mortgage FraudReport 'Year in Review" (cited in note 3)
(providing an update to prior reports that described the breadth and depth of mortgage-
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Warren Buffet, "it's only when the tide goes out that you learn
who's been swimming naked."8 7 The recession also leaves many
wounds and the transparency accompanying the recession allows
us to examine some of these injuries.
Noted here is one factor that might decrease white-collar
prosecutions, and then another factor which may serve to increase these prosecutions. Looking first at a possible decrease of
white-collar prosecutions is consideration of how the economy
has affected the print media and how a declining print media can
have a negative impact on investigative reporting that in the
past played a role in uncovering white-collar criminality.8 8 Second, however, is the government bailout and its accompanying
distribution of Trouble Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds that
may lead to new prosecutions resulting from fraudulent conduct
and mismanagement of funds that were received from the government. New institutional initiatives like the Financial Fraud
Task Force provide a new emphasis on proceeding against this
form of criminality; and this increased government scrutiny may
89
also result in increased prosecutions of white-collar crimes.
Whether these two occurrences, the decline of print media and
increased prosecutions from fraudulent use of stimulus money,
will result in a statistical wash remains to be seen.
Print media is driven by advertising. 90 It is advertising that
pays the predominant costs of the publication of newspapers. 9 1
fraud crimes in the United States).
86 See McCoy, Recession Forces Unraveling Ponzi Schemes Into the Open, USA Today
at B1 (cited in note 84) (discussing the manner in which Ponzi schemes are unearthed
during a recession). See also Adam Smith, The Reasons Fraud Spikes in a Recession
at http//www.time.contime/business/article/
online
2009),
20,
(Time May
0,8599,1899798,00.html (visited Sept 9, 2010) (noting that tough economic times lead to
increased fraudulent activity and the reorganization of businesses uncovers existing
fraud).
87 See Alex Crippen, Warren Buffett and the Perils of Swimming Naked (CNBC Aug
6, 2007), online at httpV/www.cnbc.com/id/20147026 (visited Sept 9, 2010) (quoting American businessman, investor, and philanthropist Warren Buffet).
88 See Paul Farhi, Under Siege, Am Journalism Rev 26 (Feb/Mar 2006) (discussing
the decline of the newspaper industry); Peter Behr, Looking for Answers in the Enron
reStory (Nieman Reports 2002), online at httpV//www.nieman.harvard.edu/
portsitem.aspx?id=101333 (visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing the press's role in uncovering
the Enron scandal).
89 See generally notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
90 See Editors Only, Magazine, Newspaper PublishersHard Hit by Recession (Associated Content Aug 7, 2009), online at httpV/www.associatedcontent.conVarticle/
2034403/magazine newspaper_ publishershard.html?cat=55 (visited Sept 9, 2010) (noting the effect of lost advertising revenue on print media).
91 See Richard Perez-Pena, Newspaper Ad Revenue Could Fallas Much as 30 Percent,
NY Times B3 (Apr 15, 2009) ("Newspapers count on advertising for the bulk of their revenue.").
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Three key advertising areas were significantly hurt by the economy-real estate, jobs, and sales. 92 For example, the automobile
industry that advertised extensively in print media suffered in
the economic crisis, resulting in a decrease in their purchase of
newspaper advertisements. 93 Companies have merged, resulting
in the consolidation of advertisements, as only one newspaper
advertisement may be needed to cover the combined businesses. 94 In addition to newspapers, magazines have also been hit
hard by decreased advertising resulting from the recession. 95
Advertising revenue is often related to circulation of the
product, and a decreased circulation can result in decreased advertisements. 96 The fewer subscribers, the less interest there is
by advertisers to use this forum to disperse their products.
Online access to news can reduce the number subscribing to
print media, especially in a depressed economy.
Print media has historically played an important role in investigative reporting, including newspapers investigating key
financial misconduct. 97 The print media has also played an important role in uncovering white-collar crimes, especially those
98
related to government corruption on the state and local level.
92 See Richard Hine, Recession Will Hit Newspapers Hardest(Gerson Lehrman Group
News
Feb
19,
2008),
online
at
httpV/www.glgroup.con/NewsWatchPrefs/
Print.aspx?pid=21861 (visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing how classified advertisements
were down in three major sectors: help wanted, real estate, and automotive); see also A
Bright Spot Online for Automotive Ad Spend (Nielsenwire Apr 1, 2009), online at
http;/blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online-mobile/a-bright-spot-online-for-automotive-adspend/ (visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing what forms of advertising the automotive industry spent their money on in 2007 and 2008).
93 Id.

94 See, for example, Donna L. Montaldo, The Merger of Two Retail Giants (About.com
July 18, 2005), online at http;//couponing.about.conVh/2005/07/18/the-merger-of-tworetail-giants.htm (visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing the merger of May Department Stores
Inc. and Federated Department Stores Inc.); Renee DeGross, Rich's Name Soon Will Fade
into History 'The End of an Era" Stores to be Known Just as Macy's, Atlanta Journal
Constitution B1 (Dec 23, 2004) (discussing the merger of Macy's and Rich's Dept stores).
95 See OpEdNews.com, Magazine, Newspaper Publishers Hard Hit by Recession,
(OpEdNews.com Sept 16, 2009).
96 Developing Media Plans: Basic Advertising, (BusinessTown.com), online at
httpV/www.businesstown.conVadvertising/basic-media.asp (visited Sept 9, 2010) (explaining the essentials of advertising, including the correlation between media circulation and
the product).
97 See Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, and Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on
Corporate Fraud 2-3 (Chicago GSB Research Paper No 08-22, Oct 1, 2008), online at
http/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=891482 (visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing who exposes corporate fraud, including journalists, who played a role in exposing
fraud in 13 percent of the sample cases).
98 See Russell Wild and Margaret Engel, The Demise of Investigative Journalism
(Huffmgton Post Mar 12, 2009), online at httpV/www.huffingtonpost.com/russell-wildand-margaret-engeVthe-demise-of-investigatib_174438.html (visited Sept 9, 2010) (dis-
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Between increased computerization and the recession, there
has been a diminishing print media. 99 In addition to the fact that
many people now receive their news online, print newspapers
across the United States are closing.' 00 Investigative reporter
Laura Frank, in a two-part series, outlines many achievements
of investigative reporters, while also noting the demise of this
important media role. 1°1
It is clear that as print media suffers, it is likely that there
will be some effect on investigative reporting. The state and local
level may be the hardest hit as print media has suffered the most
in the non-national arena. 0 2 In this regard we are likely to see
less local and state corruption investigations by the media, and
perhaps this will translate into less accountability to the public.
What remains an unknown is whether online journalism will
permit reporters the time and resources to offer some investigative reporting substitutes.
While the decreasing role of print media may serve to reduce
the number of white-collar crime prosecutions, increased government scrutiny may actually result in a higher number of cases being brought. The government has provided substantial
funds to stimulate the economy, including the establishment of
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). 10 3 Oversight is provided by the Special Inspector General of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), 10 4 and we may see white-collar prosecutions coming from this new arena.
cussing the significance of investigative journalism as society's "watchdogs").
99 See generally Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, The U.S. Newspaper Industry in Transition
(Congressional Research Service July 9, 2009), online at httpV/www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R40700.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing problems in the newspaper industry
and the effect of the financial crisis and technological developments on this industry).
loo See Michael Sukolove, What's a Big City Without a Newspaper?,NY Times Mag 36
(Aug 9, 2009) ("Just this year, The Rocky Mountain News perished. The Seattle PostIntelligencer became a Web-only publication with a tiny staff. Detroit's daily newspapers
are now delivered just three days a week. The Boston Globe, owned by the New York
Times Company, and The San Francisco Chronicle, owned by Hearst, each went through
near-death experiences as their owners won labor concessions after threatening to shutter the papers."). See also Shawn Moynihan, 'Editor& Publisher' to Cease Publication
After 125 Years (Editor & Publisher Dec 10, 2009).
101 See Laura Frank, The Withering Watchdog-Expose: America's Investigative Reports, (PBS Sept 21, 2009), online at http-//www.pbs.org/wnet/expose2009/06/thewithering-watchdog.html (visited Sept 9, 2010).
102 See note 100 and accompanying text.
103 See Jackie Calmes, Audit Finds TARP ProgramEffective (NY Times Dec 9, 2009),
(visited
online at http;//www.nytimes.com/2009/12/10/businessteconomy/10audit.html
Sept 9, 2010) (discussing the successes of TARP).
104 The Special Inspector General for TARP was established by section 121 of the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, PL 110-343, 122 Stat 3765 (2008). See
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The October 21, 2009 report of SIGTARP notes how its investigations division "has developed into a sophisticated whitecollar investigative agency." 10 5 The Report also notes that
"SIGTARP has opened 61 and has 54 ongoing criminal and civil
investigations."1 0 6 The Report describes the areas of these investigations as "suspected TARP fraud, accounting fraud, securities
fraud, insider trading, bank fraud, mortgage fraud," and a host of
other white collar offenses. 10 7 It includes crimes that are typically
used in modern-day white collar cases, like money laundering. 0 8
The Report also includes its role in the investigation of a Ponzi
scheme that resulted in a ten year sentence to the accused. 10 9 It
is clear from this report that financial crimes are being investigated and prosecuted, and having a designated body focused on
these crimes is an indication of renewed government interest in
this form of criminality.
A second indication that financial crimes will be a top government priority is demonstrated in the creation of a Financial
Fraud Task Force. President Barack Obama issued an Executive
Order that establishes this task force, and the Order includes a
long list of government players serving on this coordinated
body.' 1 0 The three-fold mission of this task force includes increased cooperation between "[state, local, tribal, and territorial
law enforcement.""' The task force also serves to provide the
attorney general with advice on investigation and prosecution of
a host of different financial crimes. 112 One can only assume that
also Statutory Authority, SIGTARP, online at http;/www.sigtarp.gov/about-stat.shtml
(visited Sept 9, 2010) (discussing SIGTARP's creation and its general responsibilities).
105 SIGTARP Quarterly Report to Congress 6 (SIGTARP Quarterly Report Oct 21,
2009), online at http/www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/October2009-QuarterlyReport to Congress.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2010).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.

109 SIGTARP QuarterlyReport at 6 (cited in note 105).
110 Executive Order 13519, Establishment of the Financial Fraud Task Force 60123,
74 Fed Reg 222 (Nov 19, 2009).
111 Id.
112 One of its missions is to:
[P]rovide advice to the Attorney General for the investigation and prosecution of
cases of bank, mortgage, loan, and lending fraud; securities and commodities
fraud; retirement plan fraud; mail and wire fraud; tax crimes; money laundering; False Claims Act violations; unfair competition; discrimination; and other
financial crimes and violations (hereinafter financial crimes and violations),
when such cases are determined by the Attorney General, for purposes of this
order, to be significant.
Id at 60124 § 3.
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coordinated efforts and increased focus on financial crimes will
serve to stimulate prosecutions in this area.
CONCLUSION

Although there is uncertainty about whether white-collar
criminality caused the recession, it is important that before
placing blame for the economic downturn on recent frauds and
Ponzi schemes, there is careful consideration of these two occurrences to truly discern whether a correlation exists. Those who
are quick to place blame on white-collar criminality may motivate legislators to react with new crimes, increased sentences, or
new legislation to provide increased oversight. In some cases
these reactions are warranted and may prove important in diminishing future criminality. In other situations these reactions
may do nothing more than add to our already overcriminalized
society and may move resources from areas that may prove to be
tomorrow's problems. It is important to recognize that a redistribution of funding can have long-term consequences that might
not be visible in the immediate moment.
Irrespective of whether white-collar criminality caused the
recession or whether it just became visible as a result of the recession, it is clear that there will be ramifications to this area of
the law as a result of the economic downturn. The ripples of the
recession have had a huge impact on print media, and this could
reduce the discovery of future white-collar crimes. Yet, with the
government emphasis on financial fraud and fraud that may be
forthcoming from the distribution of government money, one has
to wonder if the number of federal financial fraud prosecutions
will increase. Either way, it is important that legislators and
courts use measured responses when reacting to today's financial
problems.

